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Abstract 
The aspiration of the 'Democracy Unbound' project was to extend democracy in two 
dimensions:  range and scope.  The former would give a wider range of people the 
vote.  The latter would give people a wider scope of things to vote on.  In practice, 
no doubt there is room to do much more of both.  But whereas it would be 
democratically justifiable in an ideal world for democracy to be completely 
unbounded as regards range, even in an ideal world democracy ought be subject to 
some limits internal to the logic of democracy itself as regards its scope. 
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Introduction 
This set of papers brings closure to a project creatively entitled 'Democracy 
Unbound'.  That formulation constituted something of a creative stretch, 
productively combining range and scope.  In one direction, it invited critical 
examination of boundaries:  limits on who is empowered to practice democracy 
together.  In another direction, it invited critical examination of constraints on 
democratic rule:  limits on what those deciding democratically are thereby 
empowered to do.  Unbound in both directions, democracy would involve more 
people deciding more things together. 
Perversely, I want to pause – however late in the day – to consider a prior 
question.  What is it for decisions, made democratically (or otherwise), to be 
binding?  Once we get clear on the nature of bindingness, we will be into a position 
to contemplate what it might really mean for democracy to be unbounded (or even 
just substantially less bounded) in either (or both) its range and scope. 
 
I. The Bindingless of Law 
We typically say that democratically enacted laws are 'binding' on people in the 
state that has democratically enacted them.  But what does that amount to? 
The first thing it means for a law to be 'binding' on you is that it applies to you.  
You are subject to the law's commands.  You are an addressee of its orders.  The 
law speaks to you, among others.  Your conduct will be assessed by reference to 
the law's requirements, and when accounting for your conduct to the authorities 
you will be expected to do so inter alia by reference to that law. 
To say a law is 'binding' on you is to say more than merely that it applies to you, 
however.  'Binding' implies constraint.  To say a law is 'binding on you' means that 
you 'must obey' it – until the law is repealed, unless you are exempted from it, or 
whatever.   
The constraint rarely amounts to complete restraint.  Laws can be binding without 
literally preventing you from doing otherwise.  But a law would be an empty 
formality if it did nothing materially to alter one's options.  To be binding in any 
fuller sense, law needs to be backed by force of some sort. 
Typically, that force is in part physical and in part moral.  The bindingness of a law 
gives you a reason to obey, as well as an incentive to do so.  One reason you 'must 
obey' a binding law is of course that there are penalties imposed, by force of law, 
on disobedience.  Typically, however, there is a moral side to it as well.  Laws made 
by legitimate authorities have moral force.  People ought to obey such laws, on 
pain of legitimate penalty.  Such laws are morally as well as legally binding. 
Of course, in some formal legal sense any law made by a legitimate authority is 
binding:  that follows simply from the definition of what it is for authority to be 
'legitimate'; it is empowered make binding laws.  And of course one thing that can 
make a political authority legitimate is its 'being democratically elected'.  So there 
is one very easy, straightforward connection between 'democracy' and the 
'bindingness' of laws, via the intermediary notion of 'legitimacy'.  Here, however, I 
want to enquire what more is involved in laws being 'democratically binding', 
beyond the sheer fact that they are legitimate. 
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II. What Does It Add to Say the Laws are Democratically Binding? 
The phrase 'democratically binding' can be read in either (or both) of two ways, 
both relevant to the concerns of the 'Democracy Unbound' project.  On first 
reading, a law that is 'democratically binding' is binding (or perhaps just 
'particularly binding') because, and just because, it has been made democratically.  
On the second reading, a law that is 'democratically binding' is binding (or perhaps 
'particularly binding) on democracies and people and peoples committed to 
democratic principles more generally. 
These two strands can be connected by expanding the adverbial qualifier in 
'democratially binding'.  Let us expand that phrase to read:  'binding by virtue of 
their democraticness'.  That is to say two things.  The first regards the source of 
the bindingness of those laws.  Laws that are 'democratically binding' are binding 
because of (by virtue of) their democraticness.  The second regards the agents who 
are thus bound.  Laws that are 'democratically binding' are binding on democracies 
and people committed to democratic principles by virtue of their democraticness, 
once again. 
The same general pattern holds for analogous locutions.  Rules that are said to be 
'religiously binding' are binding because of their consonance with religious 
principles, and they are binding on people of the faith.  Rules that are said to be 
'morally binding' are binding because of their consonance with moral principles, and 
they are binding on people committed to leading the moral life in that way.   Such 
rules are binding, in both senses, 'by virtue of' their religiousness or ethicalness, 
respectively. 
The 'by virtue of' formulation not only points to the reason – the rationale, the 
'because' – for considering a law or rule binding. That rationale also enables us, at 
the same time, to identify on whom the law or rule is binding. 
To say a law is 'democratically binding' is thus to say it is binding by virtue of the 
fact that it was enacted democratically.  It was enacted not just by any old 
legitimate authority, but by a democratic authority.  And it was enacted not just by 
any old authority following democratically-correct surface procedures, but by an 
authority that was conforming to deeper democratic principles as well as the more 
superficial trappings of procedural democratic forms. 
Pause briefly to consider just how inadequate thin procedural definitions of 
democracy actually are.  For anyone tempted to equate democracy simply with 
majority rule, there is much to give them pause.   For a start, there are lots of 
things you must democratically worry about, before votes are aggregated in that 
way.  Who gets to vote?   In constituencies constituted how? On an agenda set by 
whom?  And so on.  Furthermore, there are lots of things you must democratically 
worry about, after votes are thus aggregated.  I will come to some of those shortly.   
But for the moment let us just focus on the aggregation rule itself.  Tempting 
though it may be to associate democracy preeminently with majority rule, there are 
actually certain purposes for which both supermajority and submajority rules are 
democratically to be preferred.  Supermajority rules seem democratically desirable 
for 'big decisions' like amending constitutions, for protecting entrenched minorities 
from majority tyranny, and so on.1  Submajority rules are useful within legislatures 
as 'accountability-forcing mechanisms.  One use, for example, is to force legislation 
to a formal, recorder vote, in order that representatives can be held accountable for 
their votes on that legislation in subsequent elections.2  So even just as regards 
aggregation rules, there is no purely procedural answer to the question of what is 
truly 'democratic'.  Recourse must be had, even there, to deeper democratic 
principles to determine which rule should be used when and for what. 
                                                 
1 Goodin & List 2006. 
2 Vermeuele 2005; 2006. 
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III. Democracy Beyond Pure Procedure 
When invited go beyond the thinnest procedural definition of 'democracy as 
majority rule', the other things that people ordinarily first  think about are other still 
fundamentally procedural issues.  They would easily agree, for example, that the 
definition of democracy ought surely extend beyond aggregation rules as such to 
the conditions that would be required in order for the votes being aggregated to 
count as democratically worthy.  'Free and fair elections' have various further 
preconditions:  freedom of political speech, multiple candidates for each office 
taking distinct positions, non-intimidation at the voting place, fair counting of votes, 
and so on.   
Pressed to say 'what else democracy requires', people might go on to add 
something about the frequency of elections, about the apportionment of electors to 
constituencies, and so on.  Pressed further, they might recall that settled though 
the franchise often seems these days, who gets to vote has historically and still in 
some places matters hugely from a democratic point of view.  And campaigners for 
global democracy who dream for a second chamber of the United Nations, popularly 
apportioned and directly elected, would extend the franchise to everyone 
worldwide.3 
If pressed still further, people might go on to admit that substantively there are 
some things that even (or perhaps especially) democracies – however democratic 
they may be in all those other respects – simply cannot do.  Among them might be 
taking people's lives, liberty or property without due process of law. 
Here, in keeping with the range-and-scope concerns of the 'Democracy Unbound' 
project overall, I want to focus on those latter two sorts of issues.  What is the 
'range' of democracy, properly construed?  To whom may (or must) a democracy's 
laws apply, and who may (or must) get a say in making them?  And what is the 
'scope' of democracy, properly construed?  What may or must or must not be 
included in content of democratic laws? 
 
A. To Whom Ought the Laws Apply? 
Consider first the 'range' of democracy – the question of to whom a democracy's 
laws apply and who gets a say in making them.   
This is a topic at the centre of discussion within the 'Democracy Unbound' project.  
I will not pretend a consensus where there is none.  But at least the polar positions 
are clear, even if there are those who prefer to occupy mixed positions somewhere 
between those poles.4 
At one extreme lies the 'communitarian' way of constituting the demos.  
Democratic procedures are there seen as devices for adducing the 'general will' of a 
People who ex ante committed to making decisions together, 'as one'.  The 
collectivity making the decision is fixed somehow:  by a prior decision; by unspoken 
sentiments, ties of 'blood and soil', shared histories and shared futures, or 
whatever; maybe just by sheer accident of history.   No matter.  On this view, how 
a demos is constituted is exogenous – 'outside the model' – from a democratic 
point of view.  Democracy, on this view, takes those pre-ordained groups as given.  
Democracy, on this view, is all about how such groups go about giving laws to 
themselves.  There is, on this view, no issue of democracy that arises in 
demarcating those groups in the first place. 
                                                 
3 Falk & Strauss 2001.  Goodin 2010. 
4 Arhennius 2005.  Bergstrom 2005; 2007.  Goodin 2007 and sources cited therein. 
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The other polar view – let's call it 'consequentialistic', although there is no settled 
nomenclature for it in its most general form – marks a striking contrast to the 
communitarian view.  This alternative view is much less relaxed about treating the 
question of to whom laws democratically ought apply and who ought get to 
participate in making them as sheer 'don't cares' from the point of view of 
democratic theory.  On this alternative 'consequentialistic' view, democratic 
principles prescribe that laws ought apply to and be made by everyone whose 
actions and choices affect one another.   
A more specific corollary of that more general rule – and the form in which it is 
most commonly discussed within democratic theory – is the 'all affected interests' 
principle.  On what I regard as the most defensible version, that principle holds that 
'all those who probably will be affected by any possible decision arising out of any 
possible agenda ought democratically be included among those making that 
decision'.5   
There are of course counterexamples to that, in the practice of real-existing 
democracies.  Some of our laws are taken to apply to those who had no part in 
making them.  Visiting tourists have to comply with our country's road rules when 
driving in that country, for example; and resident aliens, even if long-term 
residents, are not entitled to a vote.   Still, those look like exceptions that prove the 
rule.   The rule in question is forward-looking, and takes account of the temporally 
extended effect of laws we now make:  and the rule seems to be that the franchise 
ought be extended to anyone who is intending to be in our country for that long 
haul (in contrast to tourists, and perhaps even resident aliens who however long 
they have lived here so far have not committed to living here in the future by 
taking out citizenship).   
If the 'communitarian' account is correct, then of course there is every reason for 
democracy to be bounded and no reason for it to be unbounded.6  Communities are 
as they are, beyond the reach of democratic critique.  On that account we must 
simply take the existing bounds as given, making decisions within those bounds 
democratically – but by the same token not making decisions beyond those bounds 
democratically.  And on the 'communitarian' account, the way of demarcating those 
bounds is left open:  it might be on the basis of geography, or of race or ethnicity, 
or of gender, or of class, or whatever.  Any way of bounding a community is as 
good as any other way, on this account – or at least there is nothing within 
democratic theory as such that tells one way rather than any other on that issue. 
On that account, therefore, it would have been a terrible mistake to campaign for 
extensions of the franchise to the working classes, to women, to African-Americans, 
to Australian Aborigines.  Or anyway, it would have been a terrible mistake to do so 
in the name of democracy.  Maybe there are other good reasons we should regard 
them as members of 'our community'; but, on this account, democracy has nothing 
to do with it.  A community in which only one in a thousand people have the vote 
is, on this account, no worse on democratic grounds than one in which every adult 
has the vote. 
I can well imagine some philosophers responding to those examples with a hearty, 
'Just so!'  But as the old slogan goes, 'One person's QED is another's reductio ad 
absurdum'.  For my own part, I do indeed regard those implications as reductios of 
the communitarian approach to these issues, and I will discuss it no further. 
Instead, I want now to explore further how we might actually implement the 
'consequentialistic' range requirement, extending the franchise to 'all affected 
interests'.  As I have argued elsewhere, that phrase has to be understood 
expansively if the requirement is to avoid incoherence:  it has to extend to all 
                                                 
5 Goodin 2007. 
6 Walzer 1983, ch. 2. 
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interests that are (probably) affected by any possible outcome of any possible 
agenda.  And as I there observe, that would be to extend the franchise very 
broadly indeed.   
Some commentators worry that the 'all affected interests' principle, more narrowly 
understood, might require a different electorate for each different decision.  On the 
broader understanding of that principle outlined that I favour, however, there is no 
need for that.  Just about everyone worldwide is probably affected by some possible 
outcome of just about every decision.  And even where they are not, it is only 
underinclusiveness that needs worry us:  assuming that people vote purely on the 
basis of their interests, people whose interests are unaffected by some proposal will 
vote on it randomly, so their votes make no difference to the outcome.  Judged in 
terms of consequences of the vote, it is thus costless to include such people among 
the electorate.7   
The natural outcome of that argument is an absolutely universal franchise 
worldwide, in which everyone is entitled to vote on everything, worldwide, in one 
big global democracy.  That is on the argument just sketched the most appropriate 
'range' of democratic decision-making.  It may be politically impossible to get from 
here to there, given the strength of the existing system of sovereign states with 
their own electorates.  Linguistic and other barriers may constitute a further barrier 
to implementation of that ideal.8  It may even be morally undesirable to strive that 
sort of democracy in the imperfect world as we know it, given the (morally 
unfortunate) limits to people's empathetic concerns.  I do not want to discuss any 
of those constraints in detail, however, because there are others that seem to me 
of a logically different order; and dealing with them leads directly into the next set 
of issues I want to discuss. 
Among the interests that are possibly (indeed, certainly) affected by each of our 
current actions and choices are the interests of future generations, of people who 
follow us.   The 'all affected interests' principle would require us to enfranchise such 
interests.9  But people who do not yet exist are ontologically disenfranchised.  Until 
someone invents a device that enables voters to travel back in time to cast their 
ballots, future people simply cannot vote in present elections. 
Of course, the injunction is to enfranchise 'all affected interests', not (necessarily) 
'all affected people' as such.  If we regard people as the best judge of their own 
interests, as we typically do, then the best way to enfranchise 'all affected interests' 
is to enfranchise 'all affected people'.  But occasionally people are not the best 
judge of their own interests (as in the case of the insane); and occasionally people 
are not capable of acting on their own behalf (as in the case of underage heirs or 
the infirm elderly).  In such cases, we appoint 'guardians' to represent their 
interests on their behalves.  Non-ideal it may be, but only in the sense that the 
situation is non-ideal; it is the best response we can make, in those non-ideal 
circumstances. 
The 'guardianship' model works tolerably well where we can identify people who 
can reasonably be entrusted to represent the interests in their care.  Partly it is a 
matter of knowledge, the ability to surmise what is truly in the interests of the 
people they are supposed to represent; partly it is a matter of will, the capacity to 
bring themselves to act on those interests, particularly when their own interests 
diverge.  In paradigm cases of guardianship we solve those problems by entrusting 
that responsibility to those who are 'close' to the people being represented:  close 
                                                 
7 Goodin & Lau (2011) make a similar argument in connection with enfranchising incompetent votes.  Of 
course, there is cause for concern if there is reason to think the votes of the unaffected will be non-
random – as Lopez-Garcia (2005) argues may be true of expatriates who are still entitled to vote in their 
'home' countries, despite no longer (in extreme cases, perhaps never) resident there. 
8 Although the internet may indeed open up possibilities for 'worldwide deliberation and public use of 
reason online', in the words of Thorseth (2007). 
9Cf. Tännsjö 2005; Bergstrom 2005. 
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family or friends, and such like.  In non-paradigm cases – like allowing someone to 
file an amicus curie brief on behalf of environmental interests in a case before the 
courts – we do on similar grounds of particular 'closeness' to the interests being 
represented, particular sensitivity to and empathy with the environmental interests 
being represented.10 
How well could similar strategies work with regard to the interests of future 
generations?  Well, near-term futures can probably be protected perfectly well in 
these ways. Young children never have the vote; in all real-existing democracies, 
the implicit assumption is that their interests are encapsulated in the interests of 
their parents, who exercise their own vote at least in part with an eye to what is or 
will be in the interests of their children.  There are proposals afoot to make this 
assumption more explicit by giving parents multiple votes, to be cast explicitly on 
behalf of their children.11  That is fine, because parents know their children and 
have a good idea, better the older the children become, what will indeed be in their 
future interests.  It is fine, because parents have a natural affinity (usually, if sadly 
not always) with their children and they will them success in life.   
None of that works nearly so well as we look further into the future.  There are all 
the obvious problems of information at a distance:  it is harder to imagine what the 
future world will be like; and it is harder still to imagine how distant successors will 
conceive their own interests.  But beyond that, there are problems of the will.   
Consider this:  A great many of the things we do today will affect lives 300 years 
down the track.  Now just do some back-of-the-envelope arithmetic:  assume for 
the sake of this stylized calculation that a new generation is born every 30 years, 
that is 10 generations; and assume that each person has exactly 2 children.  That 
means you will have 210 or 256 successors living in 300 years' time.  And by the 
same token, whereas each child alive today has only 2 parents, each child alive in 
300 years' time will have 256 great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great 
grandparents.   
Now, I can realistically be expected to take a particular interest in and feel special 
responsibility for the future of my 2 children.  But I cannot realistically be expected 
to take a particular interest in 256 successors 300 years down the track whom I will 
never meet.  Nor can I realistically be expected to feel the same special 
responsibility for them, when each of them has 255 other people in exactly the 
same relation to them as me.  Rawls was doubtless too conservative when thinking 
that concern with successor generations extends only to one's immediate 
offspring.12  But he was probably right that both knowledge about and concern with 
future generations, at the personal level, is something like an exponentially 
decreasing function of temporal-cum-generational distance. 
The notion of protecting the interests of future generations by person-to-person 
'guardianship' relations thus seems unpromising, at least as regards the further 
future.  Instead of protecting those further-future interests through personalized 
mechanisms like guardianship, we must instead protect them through political 
mechanisms of public policy.   
How exactly we implement that is an open question; and we might end up doing so 
by appointing someone to serve as Commissioner of the Future with a particular 
                                                 
10 Goodin 1986.  Stone 1972. Under Rule 37(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the US, 'An amicus 
curiae brief that brings to the attention of the Court relevant matter not already brought to its attention 
by the parties may be of considerable help to the Court. An amicus curiae brief that does not serve this 
purpose burdens the Court, and its filing is not favored.' 
11 Van Parijs 1998.  Better yet (and directly contrary to Van Parijs' own proposal), perhaps we should 
give the votes to their grandparents to cast on the children's behalf; it is my hunch (and one Jim Fishkin 
tells me Peter Laslett shared) that they would be more disinterested guardians of the children's interests 
than the parents themselves. 
12 Rawls 1972, p. 292. 
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brief for intervening to protect the interests of future generations.13  That might 
look sort like a 'Guardian for the Future'.  But despite those appearances, the 
mechanism is really quite different.  It involves imposing duties to the future, as a 
matter of public policy rather than personal representations.  If the Commissioner 
for the Future is to have any power, the legislation creating that office must specify 
certain sorts of things that the state must and must not do with respect to future 
generations, and empower the Commissioner to make political (and perhaps legal) 
complaints when the specified duties to the future are violated.   
Realistically, the only way that can happen in a democracy is of course through 
legislation enacted in the standard democratic way.  But let us not recognize the 
moral limits of that realism, here.  It is not as if protecting the future is something 
that democratic majorities can decide to do, or not, just as they please.  If the 
correct principle for constituting the demos in the first place is to extend the vote, 
or equivalent protections, to 'all affected interests' – and if those future interests 
might (indeed, will) be affected – then implementing some way of protecting future 
interests in not democratically merely optional.  It is a democratic 'must'.  
Democracies are being undemocratic, insofar as they fail to do so. 
Similarly, democracies are being undemocratic insofar as they fail to meet demands 
legitimately lodged on behalf of the future.  Realistically, democratic majorities can 
always vote to overrule or ignore the Commissioner for the Future, or to withdraw 
his or her commission.  But democratically they cannot.  The interests of the future 
constitute constraints on the legitimate scope of decision-making power of today's 
democratic majorities. 
In short, democratic principles require substantive limits to be imposed on current 
majorities in aid of inevitably disenfranchised interests such as those of future 
generations. 
 
B. Democratic Bounds on What Democracies Can Do 
There are of course other familiar substantive limits on what democratic majorities 
can legitimately do, within the scope of democratic principles. 
One of them – to return to the 'proceduralist' theme with which I began – is that 
the currently sovereign people cannot bind future sovereign peoples.  To some 
extent, that is a trivially analytical point, tied to the definition of what is for a 
people to be 'sovereign':  the future people simply would not be 'sovereign' if it 
were capable of being bound.14  But the depth of the point extends beyond that 
trivial analytical truth.  It would be inconsistent with the democratic purposes for 
which we made one electorate sovereign to allow it to act in such a way as to bind 
a future electorate that the same democratic purposes impel us to regard as 
equally entitled to sovereignty.  'Giving laws to ourselves' – the master slogan of 
democracy15 – requires that each generation be free, formally and insofar as 
practicable practically as well, to craft laws of its own choosing. 
In passing, note here the connections to Mill's argument against allowing one to 
'sell oneself into slavery':  whatever reason we have to respect people's choices, 
that provides no reason to respect their choice to abnegate all future choice.16  At 
the macro-political level, pause to consider what implications that might have for 
'renouncing one's sovereignty' by agreeing for one's polity to be subsumed into 
some other.  The fathers of international law discussed this in relation to conquered 
nations being subsumed by the conquering nation; the discussion there typically 
                                                 
13 Either as an Ombudsman or with reserved seats in Parliament.  See, e.g., Dobson 1996; Ekeli 2005. 
14 That, expressed in terms of the sovereignty of Parliament, is Dicey's (1908) version of the argument. 
15 Goodin 2005. 
16 Mill 1859. 
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mimicked at the national level the traditional discourse about how an individual 
warrior, defeated in battle, might reasonably agree to live as his conqueror's slave 
rather than be put to death (as his conqueror has every right to do).17  But the 
issue resurfaces in modern times with, for example, states ceding sovereignty to 
supra-state organizations like the European Union.   
Seen as an issue in democratic theory, the issue is relatively simple – far simpler 
than ordinarily seen in the non-too-theoretically-sophisticated discourse (public and 
otherwise) surrounding the EU.  The issue is simply whether, in ceding sovereignty, 
the People in question cease 'giving law to themselves'.  They do, insofar as the 
sovereign to which they cede sovereignty is not democratically responsive to their 
wishes.  They do not, insofar as that sovereign is democratically responsive to their 
wishes (among others, of course).   That is to say, the democraticness of the 
sovereign to which one cedes authority is the key to determining whether a ceding 
of authority is democratically legitimate or not.  And that is why the EU's 
'democratic deficit' matters so hugely, from a democratic-theory point of view. 
But my primary focus here is on not procedural but substantive limits to the scope 
of legitimate democratic authority.  One of those limits we have already seen, 
deriving from the democratic duty to be solicitous of the interests of those whose 
interests ought democratically be taken into account but who are inherently 
disenfranchised, like future generations. 
Other examples of substantive limits to the writ of democratic rule are 
conventionally couched in terms of 'human rights'.  There are certain things that 
public authorities ought not do, even if they are democratically elected, such as 
abnegate rights of life, liberty and property without due process of law.   
Sometimes those are taken to be 'higher duties', standing outside of and exercising 
a supervisory role over the operation of democratic principles.  But sometimes – 
and in my view, typically more correctly – they are seen as manifestations of those 
democratic principles themselves.  That is to say, for the selfsame reasons we think 
that peoples ought govern their collective affairs according to democratic 
procedures, we also think that they ought govern their collective affairs in such a 
way as to respect those fundamental rights.   
Democracies cannot, consistently with their fundamental legitimating principle, 
endorse torture or genocide.  That is not to say that torture and genocide might not 
be enacted into policy by the procedurally-proper vote of a democratic majority, 
from time to time.  It is merely to say that, whatever reason you have for deciding 
what to do by 'counting votes' in the first place, that selfsame consideration 
constitutes a compelling reason not to allow genocide among the things that you 
will count votes for.18 
The classic formulation of such principles that are internal to the logic of democracy 
is Locke's 'life, liberty and property'.  Supposing the purpose of democracy to be (in 
Macpherson's dismissive phrase19) 'protective', and supposing those are the 
interests it is to protect, it would be contrary to the purposes of democracy to make 
the protection of 'life, liberty and property' a purely contingent matter of how the 
votes come down. Of course, we have to protect the 'property interests' – the 
interests in having property – even of those presently without property.  And where 
one person's property interests clash with another person's, we cannot satisfy both 
simultaneously.  But while redistribution is thus licensed, a democracy's wanton 
neglect of everyone's interests in property, or life or liberty, would be profoundly 
contrary to the purposes of that democracy. 
                                                 
17 Vattel 1758. 
18 Goodin 1986.  
19 Macpherson 1977. 
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I do not want to attempt to detail what all property rights there are that must be 
democratically respected in this way, as a matter of democratic principle.  Suffice it 
to say that there clearly are some. The implication is that what democracy can do is 
necessarily subject to substantive constraints, and those constraints are themselves 
internal to democracy's own justificatory logic. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
So where does all this leave us, with respect to the question for a 'democracy 
unbound'?  The bottom line is just this.  Democracy is – or anyway, according to 
what I see as the best interpretation of its underlying principles, ought to be – 
unbounded as regards its range.  Ideally everyone ought have a vote on 
everything, worldwide – and timelessly, to boot.  But democracy ought not be 
unbounded as regards the scope of its decisional power.  There are some things 
democracy must do and other things it must not do, if it is to be a democracy at all. 
 
References 
Bergstöm, Lars.  2005.  Democracy and future generations.  In Tersman 2005, pp. 
190-2. 
Dicey, A. V.  1908.  The Law of the Constitution.  7th ed.  London:  Macmillan. 
Dobson, Andrew.  1996.  Representative democracy and the environment.  Pp. 
124-39 in Democracy and the Environment, ed. William Lafferty and James 
Meadowcroft.  Cheltenham:  Elgar. 
Ekeli, Kristian Skagen.  2005.  Representative democracy and future generations.  
In Tersman 2005, pp. 141-65. 
Falk, Richard and Andrew Strauss.  2001.  Toward global parliament.  Foreign 
Affairs, 80: 212-20. 
Goodin, Robert E.  1986.  Laundering preferences.  Pp. 75-101 in Foundations of 
Social Choice Theory, ed. Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland.  Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press.  
Goodin, Robert E.  1996. Enfranchising the earth, and its alternatives.  Political 
Studies, 44: 835-49. 
Goodin, Robert E.  2007.   Enfranchising all affected interests, and its alternatives.  
Philosophy & Public Affairs, 35: 40-68.  Reprinted in Tersman 2007, pp. 72-8. 
Goodin, Robert E.  2010.   Global Democracy:  In the Beginning.  International 
Theory, 2: 175-209. 
Goodin, Robert E. and Joanne Lau. 2011.  Enfranchising incompetents:  suretyship 
and the joint authorship of laws.  Ratio, 24: 154-66. 
Goodin, Robert E. and Christian List.  2006.  Special majorities rationalized.  British 
Journal of Political Science, 36:  213-42. 
López-Guerra, Claudio. 2005.    Should expatriates vote?  Journal of Political 
Philosophy, 13:  216-34.  
Macpherson, C. B.  1977.  The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy.  Oxford:  
Clarendon Press. 
Mill, John Stuart.  1859.  On Liberty.  In Wolheim 1975, pp. 5-141.  
Harmondsworth, Pengiun, 1974. 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 1, n. 5 (2011) 
ISSN: 2079-5971 11 
Robert E. Goodin   Democratically Binding 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 1, n. 5 (2011) 
ISSN: 2079-5971 12 
Rawls, John.  1972.  A Theory of Justice.  Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard University 
Press. 
Stone, Christopher D.  1972.  Should trees have standing?  Toward legal rights for 
natural objects.  Southern California Law Review 45:  450-501.  
Tännsjö, Torbjörn.  2005.  Future people and the all affected principle.  In Tersman 
2005, pp. 186-9.   
Tersman, Folke, ed.  2005.  Democracy Unbound:  Basic Explorations.  Vol. 1. 
Stockholm: Filosofiska institutionen, Stockholms Universitet. 
Torseth, May.  2007.  Worldwide deliberation and public use of reason online.  In 
Tersman 2007. 
Tersman, Folke, ed.  2007.  Democracy Unbound:  Basic Explorations.  Vol. 2. 
Stockholm: Filosofiska institutionen, Stockholms Universitet. 
Van Parijs, Philippe.  1998.  The disfranchisement of the elderly, and other 
attempts to secure intergenerational justice.  Philosophy & Public Affairs, 27:  
292-333. 
Vattel, Emerich de.  1758.  The law of nations, or the principles of natural law, 
trans. Joseph Chitty.  Philadelphia:  T. and J. W. Johnson, 1863.  Trans. 
Charles. G. Fenwick.  New York:  Oceana, 1964 
Vermeule, Adrian.  2005.  Submajority rules: forcing accountability upon majorities.  
Journal of Political Philosophy, 13:  74-98. 
Vermeule, Adrian.  2006.  Judging under Uncertainty.  Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard 
University Press. 
Walzer, Michael.  1983.  Spheres of Justice.  Oxford:  Martin Robertson. 
 
 
